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The doctrine of hell has been a vexed issue among Christians since the earliest times. Broadly 
speaking, the disputants can be grouped into three camps: (1) traditionalists, who claim that 
the damned suffer forever in hell; (2) conditionalists, who say that the damned suffer for a 
finite time in hell before being completely annihilated by God; and (3) universalists, who say 
that ultimately all will be saved, though some universalists (called restorationists) maintain 
that some people will arrive in heaven only after a temporary stop in hell that serves to 
remove their sins and make them worthy of salvation. While bookshelves are awash with 
lengthy tomes written by traditionalists and universalists defending their respective positions, 
defenses of conditionalism have tended to be restricted to journal articles and chapters in 
edited collections—at least until now, with James S. Spiegel’s book, Hell and Divine 
Goodness: A Philosophical-Theological Inquiry, purporting to be the first book-length 
defense of conditionalism. 
 
To assess the comparative merits of the three positions, Spiegel devotes the opening chapter 
of the book to investigating the biblical data, ultimately concluding that while each view 
“enjoys at least some prima facie biblical support . . . from an exegetical standpoint, 
conditionalism has the most scriptural support among the three views” (31–32). But “most 
scriptural support” does not amount to overwhelming scriptural support, by Spiegel’s own 
admission, and he concedes that the biblical evidence does not unambiguously favor any of 
the three positions. With the biblical data inconclusive, Spiegel suggests that the balance can 
be tipped for a particular side only by a close philosophical analysis of the three positions on 
hell, this being the task of the remaining chapters of the book. 
 
Chapter 2, with its focus on divine justice, begins with the oft-made objection to 
traditionalists that sending anyone to hell for eternity would be “infinitely disproportionate” 
(35) to their crimes, which renders the notion of eternal conscious torment unjust. Spiegel 
assesses the various ways traditionalists try to respond to the objection but finds them all 
wanting. That is strike one against traditionalism. The discussion then turns to the question of 
whether annihilation after a finite sojourn in hell—the conditionalist position—would be a 
more extreme punishment than the eternal conscious torment in hell that traditionalists 
suppose awaits the damned. Spiegel explains that some traditionalists assume that eternal 
conscious torment in hell is the more extreme of the two punishments, and that they think this 
makes their position more palatable on the basis that the damned deserve the most extreme 
punishment possible.  
 
Against this, Spiegel advances several reasons for thinking that annihilation is in fact the 
more extreme punishment, which he takes to be strike two against traditionalism, or at least 
against those traditionalists who favor the position based on their belief that it offers the most 
extreme form of punishment. Accordingly, I am inclined here to see Spiegel making an ad 
hominem argument against these kinds of traditionalists rather than a positive argument for 
conditionalism as such, for as far as I can tell he does not argue that the more extreme the 
punishment the better (which would, in any case, sit rather awkwardly alongside his 
affirmation that God is loving and merciful; 59–60). 
 
Chapter 3 concerns the so-called “problem of hell,” which turns on the difficulty of 
identifying a “sufficient reason” for God to permit or cause the evils associated with hell (58). 
Traditionalism is again Spiegel’s principal target, and he considers whether the free-will 
defense or the soul-making theodicy might enable the traditionalist to justify eternal 
conscious torment in hell, ultimately deciding that neither can. So, strike three against 
traditionalism. 
 
After a brief discussion about whether there are philosophical grounds for thinking the soul 
immortal, chapter 4 turns to an examination of a range of philosophical objections against 
universalism (for example, that universalism operates with “a diminished concept of 
salvation” (88) since at most it allows for a theoretical and so non-genuine possibility of 
damnation). These objections, Spiegel claims at the end of chapter 4, leave us “warranted in 
believing that not everyone is saved in the end” (100)—so, strikes one, two, and three against 
universalism.  
 
Moreover, “given the severe problems with the traditionalist doctrine of eternal conscious 
torment, this constitutes a fairly strong recommendation of the conditionalist view” (100). 
The suggestion seems to be that conditionalism is the preferred doctrine because the two rival 
positions are beset by the serious problems Spiegel has identified throughout chapters 2 to 4, 
whereas conditionalism is not. And indeed, those hoping to find meaty philosophical 
arguments in favor of conditionalism will find little to chew on here, where conditionalism 
emerges victorious more by a process of elimination (or should that be annihilation?) rather 
than by being shown to stand firm on solid philosophical arguments. This is not to say that 
Spiegel’s book lacks punch, for this is not the case. Philosophically minded Christians will 
benefit hugely from the intricate philosophical analysis of the three doctrines of hell, and 
proponents of both traditionalism and universalism will both feel challenged by his 
philosophical assaults on their respective positions here. 
 
The final chapter of the book focuses on what Spiegel calls “the problem of heavenly grief” 
(105), which concerns how the blessed in heaven could be happy when they know that loved 
ones are undergoing punishment in hell. Spiegel accepts that this is as much a problem for the 
conditionalist as it is for the traditionalist, since on the former position the blessed will know 
that loved ones who are damned will be punished and then annihilated—knowledge that 
might reasonably cause grief to the blessed in heaven. Spiegel’s suggested solution is what he 
terms “the love-web approach,” which suggests that “all of those people who were loved by 
the redeemed eventually find their way to salvation and eternal life in heaven, even if for 
some the route to redemption runs through hell” (119). In other words, the blessed would 
only be temporarily separated from their loved ones, who by virtue of being loved by the 
blessed would eventually join them in heaven. The suggestion is intriguing and deserves a 
fuller treatment than the few pages devoted to it here. 
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